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Abstract. In this paper we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game.
This game naturally appears in situations that some service providers
benefit from pairwise allocations on a network, such as the kidney ex-
changes between hospitals.
Ashlagi et al. [1] present a 2-approximation randomized truthful mecha-
nism for this problem. This is the best known result in this setting with
multiple players. However, we note that the variance of the utility of an
agent in this mechanism may be as large as Ω(n2), which is not desirable
in a real application. In this paper we resolve this issue by providing a
2-approximation randomized truthful mechanism in which the variance
of the utility of each agent is at most 2 + .
Interestingly, we could apply our technique to design a deterministic
mechanism such that, if an agent deviates from the mechanism, she does
not gain more than 2dlog2me. We call such a mechanism an almost
truthful mechanism. Indeed, in a practical scenario, an almost truthful
mechanism is likely to imply a truthful mechanism. We believe that our
approach can be used to design low risk or almost truthful mechanisms
for other problems.
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1 Introduction
Kidney transplant is the only treatment for several types of kidney diseases.
Since people have two kidneys and can survive with only one kidney, they can
potentially donate one of their kidneys. It may be the case that a patient finds a
family member or a friend willing to donate her kidney. Nevertheless, at times the
kidney’s donor is not compatible with the patient. These patient-donor pairs cre-
ate a list of incompatible pairs. Consider two incompatible patient-donor pairs.
If the donor of the first pair is compatible with the patient of the second pair and
vise-versa, we can efficiently serve both patients without affecting the donors.
In this paper we consider pairwise kidney exchange, even though there can be
a more complex combinations of transplantation of kidneys, that involves three
or more pairs. Nevertheless, such chains are complicated to deal with in the real
life applications since they need six or more simultaneous surgeries.
To make the pool of donor-patient pairs larger, hospitals combine their lists
of pairs to one big pool, trying to increase the number of treated patients by ex-
changing pairs from different hospitals. This process is managed by some national
supervisor. A centralized mechanism can look at all of the hospitals together and
increase the total number of kidney exchanges. The problem is that for a hos-
pital its key interest is to increase the number of its own served patients. Thus,
the hospital may not report some patient-donors pairs, namely, the hospital may
report a partial list. This partial list is then matched by the national supervi-
sors. Undisclosed set of pairs are matched by the hospitals locally, without the
knowledge of the supervisor. This may have a negative effect on the number of
served patients.
A challenging problem is to design a mechanism for the national supervisor,
to convince the hospitals not to hide information, and report all of their pairs.
In fact, if hiding any subset of vertices does not increases the utility of an agent,
she has no intention to hide any vertex. Moreover, in a real application, hiding
vertices involves extracting the information about other agents and finding the
right subset of vertices to hide, which is costly itself. Thus, in a real application,
if the loss stemming from being truthful is negligible, it is likely that the hospital
will absorb the small loss and remain truthful. In this work we do not define any
cost for deviating form the mechanism. However, we seek to find a mechanism
such that the gain by not being truthful is exponentially smaller than the size
of the problem.
1.1 Notations and Definitions
To model this and similar situations hospitals are called agents, and each patient-
donor pair is modeled by a vertex. Let m be the number of agents. Each agent
owns a disjoint set of vertices. We denote the vertex set of the i-th agent by Vi
and
#»
V = {V1, V2, ..., Vm} is called the vector of vertices of the agents. Denote an
instance of the kidney exchange problem by (G,
#»
V ), where G is the underlying
graph and
#»
V is the vector of vertices of the agents. Each vertex in G = (V,E)
belongs to exactly one agent. Thus, V = ∪mi=1Vi holds.
In this game, the utility of an agent i is the expected number of matched
vertices in Vi and is denoted by ui. Similarly, the utility of an agent i with respect
to a matching M is the number of vertices of Vi matched by M and is denoted
by ui(M). The social welfare of a mechanism is the size of the output matching.
A mechanism for the kidney-exchange game is the mechanism employed by
the national supervisor to choose edges among the reported vertices. The process
is a three step process. First the agent expose some of their vertices. Then
the mechanism chooses a matching on the reported graph. Finally, each agent
matches her unmatched vertices, including her non disclosed vertices, privately.
Formally, a kidney exchange mechanism F is a function from an instance of a
kidney exchange problem (G,
#»
V ) to a matching M of G. The mechanism F may
be randomized. We say a kidney exchange mechanism is truthful if no agent has
incentive to hide any vertex i.e., for each agent i, we have
∀V ′i ∈Vi ui(F (G)) ≥ ui(F (G\V ′i )) + ui(F (G\V ′i ), V ′i )
where ui(F (G\V ′i ), V ′i ) is the [expected] number of vertices that agent i matches
privately if she hides V ′i . We define almost truthful mechanisms as follow.
Definition 1. We say that a mechanism is almost truthful if by deviating from
the mechanism, an agent can gain at most an additive factor of O(logm) vertices
in the revenue, with m, the number of agents.
Consider that in a real application finding the right subset of vertices to hide
is costly. Indeed, this cost involves extracting the information of m other agents.
Thus, we hope that in an almost truthful mechanism agents reports the true
information. Consider that, if we let the gain of deviating from the mechanism
to be a constant fraction of the revenue of the agent, this gain may become
considerable for agents with very large revenue. Thus, in a real application, the
agents with very large revenue may prefer to form a team to find the right set
to hide.
Remark that, in this paper we do not consider a cost for deviating from the
mechanism, and thus, we use two different notations of truthful mechanisms and
almost truthful mechanisms.
Given that some pairs are undisclosed, we say a kidney exchange mechanism
F is α-approximation if for every graph G the number of matched vertices in the
maximum matching of G is at most α times the expected number of matched
vertices in F (G). This means that for every graph G
|Opt(G)|
E[|F (G)|] ≤ α,
where Opt(G) is the maximum matching in graph G, and the expectation is over
the run of the mechanism F .
We define the notion of bounded-risk mechanisms as follow.
Definition 2. A mechanism is a bounded-risk mechanism if the variance of the
utility of each agent is is bounded by a constant.
1.2 Related Work
The model considered in this paper was initiated by So¨nmez and U¨nver [9] and
Ashlagi and Roth [2]. So¨nmez and U¨nver [9] show that there is no deterministic
truthful mechanism that gets the maximum possible social welfare. See Figure 1.
In this example, the number of vertices is odd. Therefore, any mechanism that
provide a maximum matching leaves exactly one vertex unmatched. Consider a
mechanism that leaves a vertex of the first agent unmatched. In this case the
utility of the first agent is 2. If this agent hides the fifth and the sixth vertices,
any maximum matching matches the first vertex to the second vertex and the
third vertex to the fourth vertex. Later, agent one matches the fifth and sixth
vertices, privately. This increases the utility of the first agent to 3, and means
that such a mechanism is not truthful. Similarly, if the mechanism leaves a vertex
of the second agent unmatched, she can increases her utility by hiding the second
and third vertices and matching them privately. This shows that a mechanism
that always reports a maximum matching is not truthful.
Fig. 1. Black vertices belong to the first agent and white vertices belong to the second
agent.
Achieving social welfare optimal mechanisms, which are truthful, is thus not
possible. However, achieving approximate truthful mechanisms may be possible.
Ashlagi et al. [1] used the same example as in Figure 1 to show that there is
no deterministic truthful mechanism for the kidney-exchange game, with ap-
proximation ratio better than 2. Moreover, they show that there is no random-
ized truthful mechanism with an approximation ratio better than 8/7. They
also introduce a deterministic 2-approximation truthful mechanism for the two
player kidney exchange game and a randomize 2-approximation truthful mecha-
nism for the multi-agent kidney exchange game. Later Caragiannis et al. [4] im-
proved the approximation ratio for two agents to an expected 3/2-approximation
truthful mechanism. It is conjectured that there is no deterministic constant-
approximation truthful mechanism for the multi-agent kidney exchange game,
even for three agents [1].
Almost truthful mechanisms has been widely studied (See [5], [6] and [7]) with
slightly different definitions. However, all use the concept that an agent should
not gain more than small amount by deviating from the truthful mechanism.
1.3 Our Results
First, we show that the variance of the utility of an agent in the mechanism
proposed by Ashlagi et al. [1] may be as large as Ω(n2), where n is the number
of vertices. The variance of the utility can be interpreted as the risk of the
agent caused by the randomness in the mechanism. Indeed, in a real application
agents prefer to take less risk for the same expected utility. In Section 2, we
provide a tool to lower the variance of the utility of each agent in a kidney
exchange mechanism while keeping the expected utility of each agent the same.
The following theorem is an application of this tool to the mechanism proposed
by Ashlagi et. al. [1]. low variance.
Theorem 1. There exists a bounded-risk truthful 2-approximation mechanism
for multi-agent kidney exchange. Specifically, in this mechanism the variance of
the utility of each agent is at most 2 + , where  is an arbitrary small constant.
Later, in Section 3, we provide a derandomization of our mechanism. Specif-
ically, we design an almost truthful deterministic 2-approximation mechanism
for this problem. To the best of our knowledge this is the first non-trivial deter-
ministic mechanism for the multi-agent kidney exchange game.
Theorem 2. There exists an almost truthful deterministic 2-approximation
mechanism for multi-agent kidney exchange.
2 A truthful mechanism with small utility variance
Ashlagi et al. in EC’10 [1] study the multi-agent kidney exchange game. They
provide a polynomial time truthful 2-approximation mechanism called Mix and
Match. The Mix and Match mechanism is described as follows; independently
label each agent either by 1 or 0 each with probability 0.5. Remove the edges
between different agents with the same labels, i.e., for each edge (u, v) ∈ E,
if u and v belongs to different agents and these agents have the same label,
remove the edge (u, v) from G. Let G′ be the new graph. Consider all matchings
in G′ that contain a maximum matching over the induced subgraph of each
agent separately. Output the one with the maximum cardinality. Ties are broken
serially in favor of agents with label 1. The following example shows that in this
mechanism the variance of an agent utility may be as large as Ω(n2).
Example 1. Consider a game with three agents. Each agent has n3 vertices, where
n is the number of vertices in the graph. There is a perfect matching with n3
edges between vertices of agent 1 and agent 2 and there is no other edges (see
Figure 2). In this example, with probability 0.5, agent 1 and agent 2 get the same
label and all of the edges between these two agents are removed. In this case,
all edges are removed and thus the utility of each agent is zero. However, with
probability 0.5, agent 1 and agent 2 get different labels and we have a matching
of size n3 between the vertices of these two agents. In this case, the utility of
agent 1 is n3 . Therefore, the variance of the first agent utility is
σ2 = 0.5(0− n
6
)2 + 0.5(
n
3
− n
6
)2 =
n2
36
,
which is Ω(n2).
Fig. 2. In this example, the variance of the first agent utility, is Ω(n2)
Our mechanism uses a randomized truthful mechanism as a core mechanism.
We take two matchings resulting from two independent runs of the core mech-
anism. These two matchings are combined into a new matching. The way we
choose the new matching is randomized too. The new matching preserves the
expected utility of each agent, and in addition, decreases the variance of the
utility of each agent by a constant factor. This gives a mechanism with a lower
utility-variance. We repeat this procedure iteratively (See Figure 3) and decrease
the variance of the utilities to O(1). We show that for this purpose it is enough
to apply the combination of two matchings mechanism a logarithmic number of
times. For the purpose of this section, we use Mix and Match as the core mech-
anism and show that it gives us a truthful 2-approximation mechanism such
that the variance of each utility is at most 2 + , where  is an arbitrary small
constant.
Fig. 3. Hierarchy of mechanisms
One can think of our mechanism as a multi-layered mechanism. The layer-0
mechanism is the core mechanism. In the i-th layer we combine two outputs
of the layer i − 1 mechanism. Lemma 2 shows that we can use the lower layer
mechanism and create a mechanism where the variance of the utilities is almost
halved.
Note that the utility of an agent can be completely different for two matchings
M1 and M2. Let M1⊕M2 denote the symmetric difference of M1 and M2. There
may be a path from u to v in M1 ⊕M2 in which u is a vertex of agent i and
v is a vertex of agent j and i 6= j. One of the two matchings will have a utility
smaller by 1 for agent i. As the number of such paths in M1 ⊕M2 may be very
large, the difference in utility of an agent with respect to M1 and M2 can be
very large. We show how to find two matchings N1 and N2 such that the utility
of each agent with respect to these two matchings is almost equal.
Let (G,
#»
V ) be an instance of the kidney exchange graph. Consider two
matchings M1 and M2 derived by independent runs of the previous layer. Let
P = {p1, p2, . . . , pk} be a subset of distinct paths in M1⊕M2 (ignoring cycles).
Definition 3. The contraction graph Cont((G,
#»
V ), P ) is defined as follows:
– Each vertex in Cont((G,
#»
V ), P ) corresponds to one agent in (G,
#»
V ).
– There is an edge in Cont((G,
#»
V ), P ) between agent i and j if and only if
there is a path in P that begins with a vertex of agent i and ends with a
vertex of agent j.
We call this graph the contraction graph because the paths are replaced by edges.
When the instance of the kidney exchange game is clear from the context, we
drop (G,
#»
V ) from the notation of the contraction graph.
The following lemma proves that any two matchings can be transformed into
two other matchings such that for every agent i the utility of agent i in the two
new matchings has a difference of at most 2.
Lemma 1. Let M1 and M2 be two matchings of graph G. There exist two match-
ings N1 and N2 such that for any agent i we have
– |ui(N1)− ui(N2)| ≤ 2 and
– ui(N1) + ui(N2) = ui(M1) + ui(M2).
Proof. We decompose M1 ⊕M2 into two different matchings N ′1 and N ′2 such
that N ′1 ∪N ′2 = M1⊕M2. Then define N1 and N2 as N1 = N ′1 ∪ (M1 ∩M2) and
N2 = N
′
2 ∪ (M1 ∩M2) respectively. Clearly, an edge e belongs to exactly one of
N1 or N2, if and only if e belongs to exactly one of M1 or M2. In addition, e
belongs to both of N1 and N2 if and only if it belongs to both of M1 and M2.
This means that the equality ui(N1) + ui(N2) = ui(M1) + ui(M2) holds for all
agents. It holds true, regardless of the way we decompose M1⊕M2 into N ′1 and
N ′2. We now describe our approach to achieve the main property, namely, change
M1 ⊕M2 into two matchings N ′1 and N ′2 such that N ′1 ∪ N ′2 = M1 ⊕M2 and
|ui(N ′1)− ui(N ′2)| ≤ 2.
Consider the subgraph induced in G by M1 ⊕M2. The degrees of vertices
in this graph are either zero or one or two. There are three types of connected
components: cycles, even-length paths and odd-length paths. We explain how
to decompose the different parts of M1 ⊕M2 in these three cases. Every path
p decomposes into two matchings Mp1 and M
p
2 . In any such decompositions, all
the vertices of p except the endpoints are covered by both Mp1 and M
p
2 .
– Case 1: Components that are cycles. Each of these cycles is the union
of two matchings. It means that every other edge in each cycle belongs to
one of the matchings. We add one of these matchings to N ′1 and we add the
other one to N ′2. Since these two matchings cover the same set of vertices,
they have the same effect on the utility of agents.
– Case 2: Edges of even length paths. Let p be an even size path between
two vertices v and u. Let Mp1 and M
p
2 be a decomposition of p into matching
such that Mp1 covers all vertices in p except u and M
p
2 covers all vertices in p
except v. For each path, we add one of Mp1 and M
p
2 to N
′
1 and add the other
one to N ′2. However, the assignment cannot be arbitrary. The assignment is
derived by performing computations on the contraction graph. We represent
the selection of Mp1 by directing the edge in the contraction graph from the
agent that contains u to the agent that contains v. Note that we deal with
all even paths simultaneously. The difference of the outgoing and in-going
degrees of each agent exactly equals the difference of her utilities caused
by edges of even length paths in N ′1 and N
′
2. Thus, we just need to direct
edges of the contraction graph of even length paths, so as to minimize this
difference. We can direct the edges of this graph such that for each vertex
the difference of outgoing and in-going edges is at most one. This is done
by adding a matching between the odd degree vertices, directing the edges
through an Eulerian cycle and removing the added edges. We adopt this
strategy to get our almost balanced in and out degree pair of matchings,
derived from all even sized paths in M1 ⊕M2.
– Case 3: Odd length paths. Let p be a path between vertices v and u
which has an odd number of edges. We can decompose p into two matchings
Mp1 and M
p
2 such that M
p
1 covers all vertices in p and M
p
2 covers all vertices
in p except v and u. Again in this case, for each path, we add one of Mp1 or
Mp2 to N
′
1 and add the other one to N
′
2.
In one of N ′1 and N
′
2, both endpoints are matched and in the other none of
the two endpoints are matched.
We represent the selection of Mp1 by coloring the edge corresponding to
p blue. Otherwise, we color the edge red. Let the blue (red) degree of a
vertex be the number of blue (red) edges touching the vertex. The difference
between the red and blue degrees of each agent, exactly equals the difference
in her utilities caused by odd length paths in M1 ⊕M2.
We can color the edges of any arbitrary graph with blue and red such that
for each vertex the difference between the red and blue degree is at most 2.
This again is done by adding a matching of dummy edges between the odd
degree vertices, and coloring every second edge in the Eulerian cycle red and
every other second edge blue. Then we remove the fake edges added at the
beginning. Note that the start vertex of the cycle may be touched by two
red or two blue, edges. On the other hand, the other vertices in this cycle
are touched by the same number of blue and red edges. We use the following
rule: if the start vertex has a dummy edge, we use this edge as the first in
the Euler cycle. This is done such that the difference of blue and red degrees
will not accumulate to 3 (2 may be added to the difference due to the fact
that the path starts and ends in the same color, and an additional 1 can
be added to the difference when we take the dummy edge out). This clearly
implies a difference of 2 in the utility of any agent with respect to the new
matchings.
If we combine the matchings of case 2 and case 3, the difference of the utilities
for any agent with respect to N ′1 and N
′
2 may grow up to at most 3. We want
to avoid this situation. Let i be some agent for which the utility difference is 3.
The difference of the utilities is derived as follows:
– Agent i has a difference of two between the number of red edges and blue
edges. Note that this means that the other agents have a difference of at
most 1 between the number of red and blue edges, as the the agents are not
start vertices of the cycle.
– Agent i has a difference of one between the number of outgoing and in-going
edges. This means that the vertex is an odd degree vertex.
– The effect of these two differences accumulate and cause a difference of three
between N ′1 and N
′
2.
In this case, we flip the color of edges in the component that contains i. This
decreases for i the difference of N ′1 and N
′
2 from 3 to 1. Note that any vertex that
was not a start vertex of the Euler cycle has a difference of at most 1 in the edge
coloring stage. The flipping of colors still implies that the maximum difference
in the utility of every agent that is not a beginning of a cycle, is at most 1.
Together with the difference caused by even length paths, the total difference
is at most 2. Note that cycles of two different agents with difference 2 in their
utility, are disjoint. Only one agent with two red or two blue edges can exist in
every connected component. uunionsq
The following lemma uses lemma 1 to combine outcomes of two independent
runs of a mechanism.
Lemma 2. Let F be a mechanism for the multi-agent kidney exchange game
and let xi be the random variable of the utility of agent i in the mechanism F .
Then there exist a mechanism F ∗ such that for every input graph and every
agent i the following holds:
V ar(yi) ≤ V ar(xi)
2
+ 1, E[yi] = E[xi],
where yi is the random variable that indicates the utility of agent i in mechanism
F ∗.
Proof. We run mechanism F two times independently. Let M1 and M2 be the
random matchings resulting from these two runs. We apply Lemma 1 on M1 and
M2 and let N1 and N2 be the resulting matchings. The mechanism F
∗ chooses
one of the two matchings N1 and N2 uniformly at random. Note that:
E[yi] =
E[ui(N1)] + E[ui(N2)]
2
=
E[ui(M1)] + E[ui(M2)]
2
=
2E[xi]
2
= E[xi]
where the second equality is an application of Lemma 1. This means that each
agent has the same expected utility in F and F ∗. Now, we need to bound the vari-
ance of the utilities of the agents in F ∗. Let Di be the difference between ui(N1)
and the average of ui(M1) and ui(M2). Note that ui(N1) =
ui(M1)+ui(M2)
2 +Di
and ui(N2) =
ui(M1)+ui(M2)
2 −Di. Thus, we have
V ar (ui(N1)) =V ar
(
ui(M1) + ui(M2)
2
+Di
)
=
ui(M1)
4
+
ui(M2)
4
+ V ar(Di) + Cov
(
ui(M1) + ui(M2)
2
, Di
)
=
V ar(xi)
2
+ V ar(Di) + Cov
(
ui(M1) + ui(M2)
2
, Di
)
.
We get V ar(ui(N2)) =
V ar(xi)
2 +V ar(Di)−Cov
(
ui(M1)+ui(M2)
2 , Di
)
in a similar
way. The variance of yi is the average of variances of ui(N1) and ui(N2). Thus,
V ar(yi) ≤ V ar(xi)
2
+ V ar(Di). (1)
It remains to bound V ar(Di). From Bhatia-Davis Inequality [3] for any random
variable X: V ar(X) ≤ (Sup(X) − µ)(µ − Inf(X)), where µ is the expected
value of X, Sup(X) is the supremum of X and Inf(X) is the infimum of X. By
applying Bhatia-Davis Inequality to the random variable Di, we have
V ar(Di) ≤ (Sup(Di)− µ)(µ− Inf(Di)) ≤ (1− µ)(µ+ 1) ≤ 1
where the second inequality is by definition of Di and Lemma 1. Combining this
with inequality (1), gives us V ar(yi) ≤ V ar(xi)2 + 1 as desired. uunionsq
Lemma 2 provides a way to decrease the variance of the utilities, iteratively.
New we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof (of Theorem 1).
Let F 0 be the Mix and Match mechanism and let F i be the combination of
two independent runs of F i−1 from Lemma 2. We call the mechanism a multi-
layered mechanism and F i denoted i-th layer mechanism in the multi-layered
mechanism. It is easy to see that F k is a combination of 2k independent runs
of the Mix and Match mechanism which is the layer 0 mechanism. Recall that
all those combinations preserve the expected utility of every agent. Thus, this
process preserves the social welfare function, which is the sum of utilities of all
of the agents. Thus, the assumption that F 0 is a 2-approximation mechanism
immediately gives us that F k is a 2-approximation mechanism, for any k.
Now, we show that for any k, F k is truthful. We prove this by contradiction.
Suppose that F k is not truthful. Without loss of generality we assume that if
agent 1 deviates, her expected utility increases. Since, F k preserves the expected
utility of each agent, this deviation should increase the expected utility of this
agent all the way back to F 0. However, this contradicts the truthfulness of F 0.
Therefore, F k is truthful.
Now, we need to bound the variance of the utility of each agent. Without
loss of generality, we fix an agent i and bound the variance of the utility of that
agent. The same bound holds for all agents, by symmetry.
Let σ2 be the variance of the utility of the agent in F 0. We prove by induction
that the variance of the utility of this agent in F k is σ
2
2k
+ 2− 2
2k
. The base case
is clear since σ
2
20 + 2 − 220 = σ2. Assume the bound for F k and then we prove
it for F k+1. By applying Lemma 2, for F k+1 the variance of the utility of the
agent is at most
σ2
2k
+ 2− 2
2k
2
+ 1 =
σ2
2k+1
+ 1− 1
2k
+ 1 =
σ2
2k+1
+ 2− 2
2k+1
.
This completes the induction. The utility of an agent cannot exceed the total
number of vertices. Thus, we have σ2 ≤ n2. If we set k to 2 log(n) + log( 1 ), then
the variance of the utility of each agent in F k is at most
σ2
2k
+ 2− 2
2k
=
σ2
22log(n)+log(
1
 )
+ 2− 2
22log(n)+log(
1
 )
=
σ2
n2
+ 2− 2
n2
≤ + 2− 2
n2
≤ 2 + .
We note that the running time is polynomial. Indeed, running F k, combines 2k−i
instances of F 0, mechanisms. Since we set k to 2 log n+ log( 1 ), F
k operates on
n2
 instances of F
0 and contains n
2
 − 1 combinations of matchings in higher
levels. Since here both F 0 and the combination process runs in polynomial in n,
F k runs polynomial time as well. uunionsq
3 An almost truthful deterministic mechanism
In some applications, agents may not accept any risk. In this section, we modify
our randomized mechanism to a deterministic one. This deterministic mechanism
is not truthful anymore. However, it is almost truthful i.e., by deviating from the
mechanism, an agent may gain an additive factor of at most 2dlog2(m)e, where
m is the number of agents.
The analysis of the Mix and Match mechanism does not use the property that
the labels of agents are fully independent. It just uses the fact that for every two
fixed agents i and j, with probability 0.5, we assign different labels to agents i
and j. In fact, this holds even if we use m pairwise independent random bits.
We can generate m pairwise independent random bits using dlog2(m)e fully
independent random bits [8]. We call this modified mechanism that just uses
dlog2(m)e random bits, Modified Mix and Match.
Proof (of Theorem 2). For simplicity of notation, we replace log2(.) by log(.).
Our deterministic mechanism can be seen as a multi-layered mechanism defined
as follows. In Layer 0, we run the modified Mix and Match mechanism over
all possible values of the dlog(m)e random bits. The collection of all resulted
matchings is called layer 0 matchings. Note that the number of matchings for
layer 0 is at most 2dlog(m)e ≤ 2m. We now describe dlog(m)e steps to combine
these matchings together, into a single matching. We note that each layer will
halve the number of matchings, and so dlog(m)e applications of the mechanism
give a layer with a single matching and this matching is our output. After the
i-th step we inductively construct the matchings of the i+ 1-th layer as follows.
We decompose the matchings in the i-th layer into arbitrary pairs of matchings.
We use the procedure of Lemma 2 on every pair. Unlike the randomized version,
here we always output the matching between N1 and N2 that has the largest
number of edges. Clearly, in each step, the number of matchings in the layer is
halved. Thus, after dlog(m)e steps we have exactly one matchings. This matching
is the output of our mechanism.
This mechanism contains at most 2m runs of the modified Mix and Match
mechanism and at most 2m combinations of such matchings. Both the modified
Mix and Match mechanism and the combination procedure run in polynomial
time. Thus, this mechanism is a polynomial time mechanism.
Note that the average number of edges in the 0-th layer is exactly equal to the
expected social welfare in the modified Mix and Match mechanism. This follows
because every labeling among the 2dlog(m)e is equally likely. In each step, we
replace each pair with one of the matching obtained from Lemma 2. Selecting
the matching between N1 and N2 that contains the largest number of edges,
combined with the second property of Lemma 2, implies that the average number
of edges cannot decrease when we go to the next layer. Thus, the number of
edges in the last-layer matching is at least that of the modified Mix and Match
mechanism. Thus, this mechanism is a 2-approximation mechanism. We now
discuss individual utilities. The average utility of every agent in layer 0 exactly
equals her expected utility in the modified Mix and Match mechanism. Using
the first property of Lemma 2, it is clear that for a fixed agent, the difference
between its modified Mix and Match utility, and the average of her utilities in
the 1-th layer is at most 1. This holds true each time we go from one layer to
the next. Namely, for every agent, the difference in utility between the modified
Mix and Match strategy and our strategy goes up by at most 1. Thus, in the
i-th layer the difference between the utility in our deterministic mechanism and
the modified Mix and Match mechanism is at most i.
We now inspect how much an agent can gain by deviating from the mech-
anism. Since the modified Mix and Match mechanism is truthful, her utility in
the modified Mix and Match mechanism does not increase with the new strat-
egy. The difference between her expected utility in the modified Mix and Match
mechanism and our mechanism is at most dlog(m)e. A non truthful strategy can
increase the utility by at most an additive factor of 2dlog(m)e. uunionsq
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